SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY RULEMAKING ACTIVITIES AT THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Objectives of In-Transit Security

• Prevent theft and/or diversion for malevolent use

• Prompt detection, assessment, and reporting

• Prompt LLEA response
Security Rulemakings

Proposed Rule, Physical Protection of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit

- Applicable to SNF shipments >100 gram and >100 rem/hr @ 3 ft unshielded
  - Enhances existing requirements
  - Considers security concepts and lessons learned from past security Orders
  - Addresses, in part, Petition for Rulemaking from the State of Nevada (PRM-73-10)

- 75 FR 62695, published October 13, 2010 comment period closes January 11, 2011

- Proposes enhanced requirements for
  - Preplanning and coordination of shipments
  - Control and monitoring of shipments
  - Trustworthiness and reliability of personnel
Security Rulemakings
Proposed 10 CFR 73.37

- Planning & Coordination
  - Coordination with States

- Notifications & Communications

- Continuous & Active Shipment Monitoring

DOE/OCRWM Illustration
Security Rulemakings
Proposed 10 CFR 73.37

- Armed Escorts
  - Armed escorts along the entire length of the shipment

- Procedures, Training and Protection of Information

- Background Investigations
  - Personnel with access to SNF in transit (drivers, train personnel, armed escorts)
  - Communications center personnel
Security Rulemakings

Next Steps

- Supporting Guidance, NUREG-0561, to be published for public comment in November, 2010

- Comments due on Draft Proposed Rule, 10 CFR 73.37, on January 11, 2011

- Comments on supporting guidance will be due February, 2011
Questions?